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Abstract—In this paper we consider the problem of targeted
attacks in large scale peer-to-peer overlays. These attacks
aimed at exhausting key resources of targeted hosts to diminish
their capacity to provide or receive services. To defend the sys-
tem against such attacks, we rely on clustering and implement
induced churn to preserve randomness of nodes identifiers so
that adversarial predictions are impossible. We propose robust
join, leave, merge and split operations to discourage brute
force denial of services and pollution attacks. We show that
combining a small amount of randomization in the operations,
and adequately tuning the sojourn time of peers in the same
region of the overlay allows first to decrease the effect of
targeted attacks at cluster level, and second to prevent pollution
propagation in the whole overlay.
Keywords-Clusterized P2P Overlays, Adversary, Churn, Col-
lusion, Markov chains.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider the problem of targeted attacks
in large scale peer-to-peer systems. These attacks aimed at
exhausting key resources of targeted hosts to diminish their
capacity to provide or receive services [1], at preventing
data indexed at targeted nodes from being discovered and
retrieved by poisoning their routing tables, or simply at
rerouting or dropping messages addressed to targeted nodes.
Such malicious behaviors have led to the proposition of
malicious-resilient overlay systems (e.g., [2], [3], [4]). In all
these systems, it is assumed that at any time, and anywhere
in the overlay, the proportion of compromised peers is
bounded and known. Unfortunately, targeted attacks violate
such an assumption. It has been shown that peer-to-peer
overlays can survive these attacks only if malicious nodes
are not able to isolate honest nodes within the system.
This is achieved by i) preserving randomness of nodes
identifiers [5], and ii) limiting the period of time where
nodes can stay at the same position in the overlay. Induced
churn has been shown to be a fundamental ingredient to
preserve randomness. Churn is classically defined as the rate
of turnover of peers in the system [6], and thus induced
churn refers to the general idea of forcing peers to move
within the system. Several strategies based on this principle
have been proposed. Most of them are based on locally
induced churn. However either they were proven incorrect or
they involve a too high level of complexity to be practically
acceptable [5]. Some other strategies, based on globally
induced churn, force each node to periodically leave and
re-join the system. This may be enforced through nodes
limited lifetime in the system. If not properly handled, these
solutions keep the system in an unnecessary hyper-activity,
which increases accordingly the impact of churn.
In the present work, we investigate adversarial strategies
that aim at isolating honest nodes in cluster based overlays,
and we present an analytical study of the long term behavior
of the system. Our analysis shows that i) by limiting the
sojourn time of nodes at the same position in the overlay
and ii) by introducing randomness in the operations of the
overlay, pollution attacks are severely reduced at cluster level
and do not propagate to the whole overlay. A preliminary
work [7] investigates adversarial strategies in the specific
context where the sequence of join and leave events is well
interleaved. In this paper we extend this preliminary work
to a general context in which clusters size varies with churn
and thus, undergo merge and split operations. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first work that has conducted
such a study.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: In Section II,
we present existing works that focus on making structured-
based overlays robust against attacks. In Section III we
briefly describe the main features of cluster-based overlays,
and present the assumptions made in this work. Section IV
describes the robust operations implemented in the overlay.
Then, in Section V, we specify the strategy the adversary
adopts to perform targeted attacks in the system. The adver-
sarial behavior is modeled and its impact at both cluster
level and at the overlay level are respectively studied in
Sections VI and VIII. Section IX concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Different approaches have been proposed to face adversar-
ial setting, each one focusing on a particular adversary strat-
egy. Regarding eclipse attacks, a very common technique,
called constrained routing table, consists in selecting neigh-
bors based on their identifiers so that all of them are close
to some particular points in the identifier space [8]. Such
an approach has been implemented into several overlays
(e.g., [9], [10], [11]). Another defense against those attacks
comes from the observation that during eclipse attacks, the
degree of attackers is much higher than the average degree
of peers in the overlay. Addressing such attacks consists
in bounding peers degrees. Singh et al. [12] propose to
anonymously audit peers to continuously check the bounded
degree of peers. Results of their experimentation show that
their solution is effective in an overlay with low to moder-
ately high churn. More generally, the seminal works on DHT
routing security by Castro et al. [8] and Sit and Morris [13]
combine routing failure tests and redundant routing as a
solution to ensure robust routing. Their approach has then
been successfully implemented in different structured-based
overlays (e.g., [2], [4], [14]). In all these above cited works,
it is assumed that at any time, and anywhere in the overlay,
the proportion of compromised peers is bounded and a
priori known. It allows powerful building blocks such as
Byzantine tolerant agreement protocols to be used among
peers subsets [2], [4]. When such an assumption does not
hold, additional mechanisms are needed. Awerbuch et al [5]
propose the Cuckoo&flip strategy. This strategy consists
in introducing local induced churn upon each join and
leave operation. This strategy prevents malicious peers from
predicting what is going to be the state of the overlay after
a given sequence of join and leave operations. Subsequently
to this work, experiments have been conducted to check
the feasibility of global induced churn. These experiments
assume that the overlay is populated by no more than 25% of
compromised peers [15], or that the topology of the overlay
is static [7].
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Model of the Network.
We consider a dynamic system populated by a large
collection of peers in which each peer is assigned a unique
and permanent random identifier from an m-bit identifier
space. Peer identifiers (simply denoted ids in the following)
are derived by applying some standard strong cryptographic
hash function on peers intrinsic characteristics (see below).
The value of m (128 for the standard MD5 hash function) is
chosen to be large enough to make the probability of iden-
tifiers collision negligible. The system is subject to churn,
which is classically defined as the rate of turnover of peers
in the system [6]. For scalability reasons, each peer knows
only a small set of peers existing within the system and this
knowledge generally varies according to the activity of the
system. This set is typically called the node’s local view.
The particular algorithm used by peers to build their local
view and to route messages induces the resulting overlay
topology. Structured overlays (also called Distributed Hash
Tables (DHTs)) build their topology according to structured
graphs (e.g., hypercube, torus) as proposed in [9], [10], [11],
[16], [17]. Peers self-organize within the structured graph
according to a distance function D based on peers ids, plus
possibly other criteria such as geographical distance. Each
data is assigned a unique identifier, called key, selected from
the samem-bit identifiers space. Each peer p owns a fraction
of all the data items of the overlay. The mapping derives
from the distance function D. In cluster-based overlays,
clusters of peers substitute for peers at the vertices of the
structured graph. Each vertex of the structured graph is
composed of a set or cluster of peers. Peers join the clusters
according to distance D. For instance in eQuus [18], peer p
joins the (unique) cluster whose members are geographically
the closest to p, while in PeerCube [4], p joins the (unique)
cluster whose label is a prefix of p’s identifier. Clusters in
the overlay are uniquely labelled. Size of each cluster is
both lower and upper bounded. The lower bound, named
C in the following, usually satisfies some constraint based
on the assumed failure model. The upper bound, that we
will call Smax, is typically in O(logN) where N is the
current number of peers in the overlay, to meet scalability
requirements. Once a cluster size exceeds Smax, this cluster
splits into two smaller clusters, each one populated with
the peers that are closer to each other according to distance
D. Once a cluster undershoots its minimal size C, this
cluster merges with the closest cluster in its neighborhood.
In the present work we assume that at cluster level, peers
are organized as core and spare members. Members of
the core set are primarily responsible for handling mes-
sages routing and clusters operations. Management of the
core set is such that its size is maintained to constant C.
Spare members are the complement number of peers in
the cluster. Size s of the spare set is such that s ≤ ∆
where ∆ = Smax − C. In contrast to core members, spare
members are not involved in any of the overlay operations.
Rationale of this classification is two-fold: first it limits the
management overhead caused by the natural churn present in
typical overlay networks through the spare set management.
Second it allows to introduce the unpredictability required
to deal with malicious attacks through a randomized core
set generation algorithm as shown in the sequel.
In the following we assume that join and leave events
have an equal chance to occur in any cluster.
B. Model of the Adversary
A fundamental issue faced by any practical open system
is the inevitable presence of peers that try to manipulate
the system by exhibiting undesirable behaviors [13]. Such
peers are classically called malicious or Byzantine. Mali-
cious peers can devise complex strategies to prevent peers
from discovering the correct mapping between peers and
data keys. They can mount Sybil attacks [19] (i.e., an at-
tacker generates numerous fake peers to pollute the system),
they can do routing-table poisoning (also called eclipse
attacks [8], [13]) by having honest peers redirecting outgoing
links towards malicious ones, or they can simply drop or
re-route messages towards other malicious peers. They can
magnify their impact by colluding and coordinating their
behavior. We model these strategies through a strong adver-
sary that controls these malicious peers. A strong adversary
is an adversary allowed to deviate arbitrarily far from the
protocol specification. We assume that the adversary has
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large but bounded resources in that it cannot control more
than a fraction µ (0 < µ < 1) of malicious peers in
the whole network. Note that in the following we make a
difference between the whole universe and the overlay. The
universe U encompasses all the peers that at some point may
participate to the overlay (i.e. 2m peers), while the overlay
contains at any time the subset of participating peers (whose
size is equal to N ). Thus, while µ represents the assumed
fraction of malicious peers in the network, the goal of the
adversary is to populate some parts of the overlay with a
larger fraction of malicious peers in order to subvert the
correct functioning of the overlay. Finally, a peer which
always follows the prescribed protocols is said to be honest.
Note that honest peers cannot a priori distinguish honest
peers from malicious ones.
C. Security Schemes
We assume the existence of a public key cryptography
scheme that allows each peer to verify the signature of each
other peer. We also assume that correct peers never reveal
their private keys. Peers ids and keys (private and public) are
acquired via a registration authority. When describing the
protocols, we ignore the fact that messages are signed, and
recipients of a message ignore any message that is not signed
properly. We also use cryptographic techniques to prevent a
malicious peer from observing or unnoticeably modifying a
message sent by a correct peer. However a malicious peer
has complete control over the messages it sends and receives.
D. Limited Sojourn Time and Random Distribution of ids
As said in the Introduction, the two fundamental proper-
ties that prevent peers isolation are the guarantee that the
distribution of peers identifiers is random, and that peers
cannot stay forever at the same position in the system [5].
Both properties have been analytically proven assuming that
the region size is kept constant [7].
To implement both limited sojourn time of the nodes at the
same place in the overlay and unpredictable identifier assign-
ment in a cluster-based overlay, we propose to limit the life-
time of peers identifiers and to randomize their computation.
Specifically, peers identifiers are initially generated based on
certificates acquired at trustworthy Certification Authorities
(CAs). Initial identifiers (denoted id0) are generated as the
result of applying a hash function H to some of the fields
of a X.509 [20] certificate. To enforce all peers, including
malicious ones, to leave and rejoin the system from time to
time, we add the creation date t0 to the fields that appear
in the peer certificate that will be hashed to generate the
peer identifier (note that by the properties of hash functions,
this guarantees that peers identifiers are unpredictable). We
limit the lifetime peers identifier through an incarnation
number. The current incarnation k of any peer is given by
the following expression k = ⌈(t− t0)/L⌉, where t0 is the
initial creation time of the peer’s certificate, t is the current
time, and L is the length of the lifetime of peers incarnation.
Thus, the kth incarnation of a peer p expires when p local
clock reads t0 + kL. At this time p must rejoin the system
using its (k + 1)th incarnation. The t0 parameter is one of
the fields in the peer’s certificate and since certificates are
signed by the CA, it cannot be unnoticeably modified by a
malicious peer. Moreover, a certificate commonly contains
the public key of the certified entity. This way, messages
exchanged by the peers can be signed using the sender
private key, preventing malicious peers from unnoticeably
altering messages originated from other peers in the system.
Messages must contain the certificate of their issuer, so as
to allow recipients to validate them.1
Therefore, at any time, any peer can check the validity
of the identifier of any other peer q in the system, by
simply calculating the current incarnation k of peer q
and generating the corresponding identifier. Specifically, the
current identifier of peer q, denoted in the following as idq ,
is calculated by hashing q initial identifier (id0q) with the
current incarnation k of q, i.e., idq = H(id
0
q×k). This leads
to the following property.
Property 1 (Limited Sojourn Time): Let D be some
cluster of the system and p some peer in the overlay. Then
q belongs to D at time t if only if idq matches the label of
D according to distance D (we say that q is valid for D).
If some peer p detects that the id of one of its neighbors
q is not valid then it cuts its connection with q. Peer q
may re-join the overlay by triggering a join operation at
cluster D′ such that idq is valid for D
′. Note that because
clocks are loosely synchronized, it is possible that a correct
peer is still using its id for incarnation k when other correct
peers would expect it to be in incarnation k+1. To mitigate
this problem, we assume that any correct peer may have
two subsequent valid incarnation numbers, for a fixed grace
window W of time that encompasses the expiration time
of an incarnation number (W is the maximum deviation of
the clocks of any two correct peers). More precisely, at any
time t, both incarnation k and k′ are valid, where k = ⌈(t−
W/2−t0)/L⌉, and k
′ = ⌈(t+W/2−t0)/L⌉. Thus, although
each peer p has, at any time t, a single incarnation number
that it uses to define its current id, other peers calculate
two possible incarnation numbers for p. These are frequently
equal, but may differ when p’s local time is close to the
expiration time of its current/last incarnation.
IV. OPERATIONS OF THE OVERLAY
To protect the system against the presence of malicious
peers in the overlay, we propose to take advantage of peers
role separation at cluster level to design robust operations.
1Note that there are means to optimize this procedure as for example by
exchanging certificates during an initialization phase. However this is out
of the scope of our paper.
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Briefly, the join operation is designed so that brute force
denial of service attacks are discouraged. The Leave
operation impedes the adversary from predicting what is
going to be the composition of the core set after a given
sequence of join and leave events triggered by its malicious
peers. Finally, as both merge and split operations induce
topological changes in the overlay, and more importantly
may have an influence on the subset of the identifier space
the adversary may gain control over, 2 these operations have
been designed so that the adversary has, in expectation, no
interest to trigger them. Specifically,
• join(p): when a peer p joins the system, it joins
the spare set of the closest cluster in the system
(according to distance D). Core members of this cluster
update their spare view to reflect p’s insertion (note
that the spare view update does not need to be tightly
synchronized at all core members).
• leave(p): When a peer p leaves a cluster either
p belongs to the spare set or to the core set. In the
former case, core members simply update their spare
view to reflect p’s departure, while in the latter case,
the core view maintenance procedure is triggered. This
procedure consists in replacing k− 1 randomly chosen
members of the core set with k peers randomly chosen
from the whole cluster, where 1 ≤ k ≤ C (recall that
C is the size of the core set, cf. Section III-A).
• split(D): when a cluster D has reached the con-
ditions to split into two smaller clusters D′ and
D′′, core sets of both D′ and D′′ are built. Priority
is given to core members of D and completion is done
with randomly chosen spares in D. This random choice
is handled through a Byzantine-tolerant consensus run
among core members of D. Spares members of D′
(resp. D′′) are populated with the remaining spares
members of D that are closer to D′ than to D′′ (resp.
closer to D′′ than to D′).
• merge(D′,D′′): when some cluster D′ has reached the
conditions to merge (i.e., its spare set is empty), it
merges with the closest cluster D′′ to D′. The created
cluster D is composed by a core set whose members
are the core set members of D′′ and by a spare set
whose members are the union of the spare members of
D′′ and the core set members of D′.
These four operations make up the overlay protocol. In
the following protocolk will refer to as these four operations
with 1 ≤ k ≤ C the amount of randomization of the core
view maintenance procedure of the leave operation.
V. SPECIFICATION OF THE ADVERSARIAL BEHAVIOR
Based on the operations described in the previous sec-
tion, we investigate how malicious peers could proceed
2Indeed, a merge operation doubles the subset of the identifier space a
cluster is responsible for, while a split operation divides it per two.
to compromise correctness of a targeted cluster. Clusters
correctness is jeopardized as soon as a quorum of its core
members are malicious. It is well known that a necessary
and sufficient condition to prevent agreement among a set
of nodes is that strictly more than a third of the population
set is malicious [21]. In our context, cluster D is said to be
polluted if its core set is populated by more than a quorum c
of malicious peers where c = ⌊(C − 1)/3⌋ malicious peers.
Otherwise, this cluster D is said to be safe.
A. Increasing Global Representation of Malicious Identifiers
As a consequence of assigning an initial unique random
id from an m-bit identifier space to peers and of periodically
pushing peers to random regions in the overlay, the strategy
of the adversary to increase the global representation of
malicious identifiers is a combination of the following three
actions.
First, the adversary maximizes the number of malicious
peers that sit in the whole overlay. By doing so, the adversary
augments the likelihood for its malicious peers to join
targeted clusters. For those peers which cannot immediately
enter targeted clusters (because their current ids do not
match the targeted clusters label), but rather join different
clusters, the goal of the adversary is to pollute these clusters
as well. This augments the subset of identifiers space the
adversary has gained control over, and thus empowers it to
progressively surround the targeted clusters.
Second, the adversary may in some specific cases decide
to trigger a leave operation for some malicious peer in
a given core set if the outcome of the operation increases
the global representation of malicious identifiers in that set.
Indeed, if by having a malicious peer leaving the core
set of a cluster, the likelihood that the outcome of the core
set maintenance process strictly increases the number of
malicious peers in the renewed core set, then the adversary
triggers a leave operation. Formally,
Rule 1 (Adversarial Leave Strategy): Let D be a
cluster such that at time t its core set C contains 0 < x ≤ c
valid malicious peers and its spare set contains y > 1 valid
malicious peers. At time t the adversary triggers a leave(p)
operation for malicious peer p in C if, for a given small
positive threshold ν
x−1+min(k,y)∑
j=x+1
P
{
exactly j malicious peers ∈ C
after the leave operation
}
> 1−ν. (1)
Recall that k is the amount of randomization of the leave
operation. Note that for k = 1, Relation (1) is never satisfied.
Thus in this specific situation, there is no incentive for
malicious peers to trigger voluntary leaves. For k > 1,
malicious peers collude together to force the one among
them (whose id will expire the soonest) to leave the core.
As the experiments will show, decreasing the amount of
randomization of the leave operation provides the best
strategy against targeted attacks.
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Finally, once the adversary has succeeded in polluting a
cluster D, he must minimize the likelihood that D switches
back to a safe state. Switching to a safe state may occur
subsequent to either the core maintenance procedure, the
merge, or the split operations. The two latter cases are
detailed in the following section. Regarding the former case,
the adversary can bias the core set maintenance procedure
by replacing the left peer with a (valid) malicious peer from
the spare set if any. On the other hand, if the spare set does
not contain any malicious peers then the adversary has no
choice other than choosing a honest peer (otherwise clusters
in D vicinity will quickly detect that the size of D core set
is less than C).
B. Decreasing the Occurrence of Topological Operations
So far we have seen that the adversary triggers leave
operations for its malicious peers if with high probability it
increases the population of malicious peers in the core set.
However, the adversary will trigger such departures only
if this does not lead the cluster to merge with another
cluster. Indeed, by construction of the merge operation (cf.
Section IV), when D core members trigger a merge with
their closest neighbor D′ then all D members are pushed
to the spare set of the new created cluster D′′ while core
members of D′ keep their status of core members in D′′.
This clearly deters the adversary from triggering merge
operations. We have also seen that to gain the control of
clusters, the strategy of the adversary is to maximize the
number of malicious peers in both the core and the spare
sets of any cluster. However once a cluster is polluted, the
adversary has no interest to let this cluster grow in such
a way that this cluster will undergo a split operation.
Indeed, the outcome of a split operation cannot increase
the subset of identifiers space the adversary has gained
control over—at best, it keeps it the same. Thus when a
polluted cluster is close to split, the adversary acts so that
no join operations are triggered. Note that the adversary
can prevent honest peers from joining D whenever s > 1.
This guarantees that D will not grow because of honest
peers, while ensuring that D will not undergo a merge
operation as much as possible. Specifically,
Rule 2 (Adversarial Join Strategy): Let D be a clus-
ter such that at time t its core set contains ℓ > c valid
malicious peers. Any join event issued by peer q and
received at D at time t is discarded if (q is honest and s > 1)
or (s = ∆ − 1). Recall that ∆ represents the maximal size
of the spare set (c.f. Section III-A).
A possible implementation of Rule 2 is as follows: upon
receipt of a join event from an honest peer q, the adversary
asks the malicious core members to positively acknowledge
q, so that q does not detect that D is polluted, however the
associated join operation is not triggered.
To summarize, the strategy of the adversary is to maxi-
mize the whole subset of the identifiers space it has gained
control over. This is achieved by first never asking its mali-
cious peers to leave their cluster except if either Property 1
does not hold or Rule 1 holds, and second by having the
maximal number of malicious peers join the system except
if Rule 2 holds.
VI. MODELING THE ADVERSARIAL STRATEGY
The evolution of any given cluster D follows both the
overlay protocol protocolk (cf. Section IV) and the strategy
of the adversary (cf. Section V). To analyze the impact of
the adversarial strategy, we make a difference between join
(resp. leave) events and join (resp. leave) operations.
Indeed, from above, the number of leave and join events
issued at malicious peers is greater than or equal to the
number of the associated leave and join operations.
We model the effect of join and leave events using
a homogeneous discrete-time Markov chain denoted by
X = {Xn, n ≥ 0}. Markov chainX represents the evolution
of the number of malicious peers in both the core set and
the spare set of cluster D. The state space Ω of X is defined
by Ω = {(s, x, y) | 0 ≤ s ≤ ∆, 0 ≤ x ≤ C, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}.
For n ≥ 1, the event Xn = (s, x, y) means that, after the
n-th transition (i.e., the n-th join or leave event), the size of
the spare set is equal to s, the number of malicious peers in
the core set is equal to x and the number of malicious peers
in the spare set is equal to y. In the remaining of the paper,
the initial probability distribution of X is denoted by α. The
transition probability matrix M of X is detailed below.
We define a state as polluted if in this state the core
set contains more than c = ⌊(C − 1)/3⌋ malicious peers.
Conversely, a state that is not polluted is said to be safe.
The subset of safe states, denoted by S, is defined by
S = {(s, x, y) | 0 < s < ∆, 0 ≤ x ≤ c, 0 ≤ y ≤ s},
while the subset of polluted states, denoted by P , is defined
by P = {(s, x, y) | 0 < s < ∆, c + 1 ≤ x ≤ C, 0 ≤
y ≤ s}. The system alternates between safe and polluted
states until entering closed states. Closed states represent
the logical disappearance of cluster D from the graph. This
occurs when either D splits into two smaller clusters (i.e.,
its spare set has reached its maximal size ∆) or D merges
with its closest neighbor (i.e., the size of its spare set has
shrunk to 0). Three sets of closed states exist. The set of
safe merge closed states AmS defined as A
m
S = {(s, x, y) |
(s = 0) ∧ (0 ≤ x ≤ c)}, the set of safe split closed states
AℓS defined as A
ℓ
S = {(s, x, y) | (s = ∆) ∧ (0 ≤ x ≤ c)},
and the set of polluted merge closed states AmP defined as
AmP = {(s, x, y) | (s = 0)∧ (c+1 ≤ x ≤ C)}. Note that by
Rule 2 the states such that s = ∆ and c + 1 ≤ x ≤ C are
not reachable because the adversary strategizes to prevent
a polluted cluster from triggering a split operation (cf.
Section V-B). As a consequence the set of polluted split
closed states is empty. Matrix P is partitioned with respect
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to the decomposition of Ω = S ∪ P ∪AmS ∪A
ℓ
S ∪A
m
P
M =


MS MSP MSAm
S
MSAℓ
S
MSAm
P
MPS MP MPAm
S
MPAℓ
S
MPAm
P
0 0 MAm
S
0 0
0 0 0 MAℓ
S
0
0 0 0 0 MAm
P


where MUV is the sub-matrix of dimension |U | × |V |
containing the transitions from states of U to states of V ,
with U, V ∈ {S, P,AmS , A
ℓ
S , A
m
P }. We simply write MU for
MUU . Note that A
m
S , A
ℓ
S , and A
m
P are absorbing classes.
In the same way, the initial probability distribution α is
partitioned by writing α = (αS αP αAm
S
αAℓ
S
αAm
P
),
where sub-vector αU contains the initial probabilities of
states U ∈ {S, P,AmS , A
ℓ
S , A
m
P }. Figure 1 depicts an ag-
gregated view of the states partition of process X .
S
P
AmS
AℓS
AmP
Figure 1: Aggregated view of Markov chain X . All the transient
safe and polluted states are respectively represented by S and P .
States AmS , A
ℓ
S and A
m
P represent all the closed safe and polluted
states. For C = 7 and ∆ = 7, we have 288 states.
Computation of transition matrix M is illustrated in
Figure 2. In this tree, each edge is labelled by a probability
and each leaf represents the state of the cluster. This figure
shows all the states that can be reached from state (s, x, y)
and the corresponding transition probabilities. Transition
probabilities depend on i) the type of operation that occurred
(join or leave operation from the core or the spare set),
ii) the type of peers involved in this operation (honest or
malicious), and iii) the ratio of malicious peers already
present in the core set. The probability associated with each
one of these states is obtained by summing the products of
the probabilities discovered along each path starting from
the root to the leaf corresponding to the target state. For
instance, the leftmost branch of the tree corresponds to the
scenario in which some malicious peer wishes to join the
polluted cluster D. By Rule 2, this peer successfully joins
the cluster, leading to state (s + 1, x, y + 1). Now if we
consider the rightmost branch in the tree, this represents
the situation in which cluster D is polluted and one of its
malicious core member p is no more valid. By Property 1,
p leaves D, however as D is polluted, the adversary bias
the core management procedure by replacing p with another
malicious peer from D spare set. State (s − 1, x, y − 1)
is reached. For space reasons, derivation of the transition
probability matrix M is presented in [22].
Modeling and computation of both Property 1 and Rule 1
are as follows. Regarding Property 1, let d be the probability
(per unit of time) that the limited lifetime of some peer p has
not expired. Hence d is homogeneous to a frequency, and
d×∆t represents the probability that the lifetime of a given
peer identifier has not expired during ∆t units of time. From
a practical point of view, we model the limited lifetime of a
peer identifier as an exponential decay process whose half-
time constant (denoted t1/2) is related to d by the standard
relation t1/2 = ln 2/(1 − d). Consequently, the value of
L (cf. III-D) might be calibrated so that 99% of a given
population has decayed after L unit of time. Setting L =
6.65× t1/2 satisfies this requirement
3. Then the probability
that for all the peers belonging to a set of size z Property 1
holds is equal to dz . Regarding Rule 1, let q(k, ℓ, u, v) be
the probability of getting u red balls when k balls are drawn
without replacement from an urn containing v red balls and
ℓ − v white balls. We have q(k, ℓ, u, v) =
(
v
u
)(
ℓ−v
k−u
)
/
(
ℓ
k
)
.
q(.) is referred to as the hypergeometric distribution. Let
(s, x, y) be the current state of the Markov chain associated
to cluster D. Then Rule 1 holds if the chain enters one of the
following states (s−1, x+1, y−2), . . . , (s−1, x′, y′), with
x′ = x+y−1 and y′ = 0 if k ≥ x+y−1 otherwise x′ = k
and y′ = x+ y − 1− k, right after the voluntary departure
of one malicious valid core member with probability 1− ν.
From the leave operation Relation (1) writes as
imax∑
i=i0
jmax∑
j=i+2
q(k−1, C−1, i, x−1)q(k, s+k−1, j, y+ i) > 1−ν.
(2)
where i0 = max(0, k−1−(C−x)), imax = min(k−1, x−1)
and jmax = min(k, y + i). In Figure 2, notation “1{(2)}”
means that Relation (2) holds.
VII. STUDY OF A CLUSTER BEHAVIOR IN AN
ADVERSARIAL SETTING
In this section, we study the behavior of a cluster ac-
cording to the power of the adversary, the frequency of
the induced churn, and the amount of randomization k
introduced in protocolk.
A. Initial Distributions
In the experiments conducted for this work, we consider
two initial distributions. The first one, which we denote by
β, consists in assuming that the initial size of the spare set
(denoted as s0) is uniformly distributed on {1, . . . ,∆− 1}.
The initial number C0 of malicious peers in the core set
and the one S0 in the spare set both follow a binomial
distribution. The initial state X0 is thus defined by X0 =
(s0, C0, S0). Assuming that C0 and S0 are independent, we
get for x = 0, . . . , C and y = 0, . . . , s0
β(x, y) = P{C0 = x, S0 = y}
=
(
C
x
)
µx(1− µ)C−x
(
s0
y
)
µy(1− µ)s0−y.(3)
3We have that 6.65 ≥ ln 100/ ln 2.
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Probabilities Value Meaning of the probability
µ ratio of Byzantine peers in the universe U
Smax maximal size of a cluster
C size of the core set of a cluster (C is a system parameter)
∆ Smax − C maximal size of the spare set of a cluster
s current size of the spare set
x number of malicious peers in the core set
y number of malicious peers in the core set
d
probability that the lifetime of a given peer identifier has not expired
(per unit of time)
t1/2 ln 2/(1− d) half-life of a peer identifier
pj (resp. pℓ) 1/2 join (resp. leave) event probability
pc C/(C + s) probability for a peer to belong to the cluster core set
pm µ probability that the joined peer is malicious
pmc x/C probability for a core member to be malicious
pms y/s probability for a spare member to be malicious
1− dx probability that Property 1 is satisfied in the core set during one unit of time
1− dy probability that Property 1 is satisfied in the spare set during one unit of time
1{A} 1 if condition A is true, 0 otherwise represents the indicator function
τ(x, a, b)
probability of building the core (resp. spare) set with x− a+ b
q(k − 1, C − 1, a, x)q(k, s+ k − 1, b, y + a) (resp. y − b+ a) malicious peers where
with q(k, ℓ, u, v) =
(v
u
)(ℓ−v
k−u
)
/
(ℓ
k
)
max(0, k − 1− (C − 1− x)) ≤ a ≤ min(x, k − 1), and
max(0, k − (s+ k − 1− (y + a)) ≤ b ≤ min(y + a, k)
Figure 2: Transition diagram for the computation of the transition probability matrix M .
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The second one, that we denote by δ, consists in starting
from state (s0, 0, 0), that is the state free from malicious
peers, where s0 = ⌊∆/2⌋. We have
δ(s0, x, y) = 1{x=0,y=0}. (4)
B. Time Spent by Protocolk in Safe States
As described in Section VI the Markov chain X is
reducible, the subset of states S and P are transient and
the subsets AmS , A
ℓ
S and A
m
P are closed subsets. We
start our study by first investigating the distribution of
T
(k)
S which counts the total time spent by protocolk in
the subset of safe states S before absorption. Specifically
T
(k)
S =
∑∞
n=0 1{Xn∈S}. Following the results in [23], the
expectation of T
(k)
S is given by
E(T
(k)
S ) = v(I −R)
−1
✶. (5)
where v = αS + αP (I − MP )
−1MPS and R = MS +
MSP (I −MP )
−1MPS .
C. Time Spent by Protocolk in Polluted States
In the same way, its expectation is given by
E(T
(k)
P ) = w(I −Q)
−1
✶, (6)
where w = αP + αS(I − MS)
−1MSP and Q = MP +
MPS(I −MS)
−1MSP .
Figure 3 compares the expected number of operations
spent in safe and polluted states before absorption for two
protocols, protocol1 and protocolC , as a function of µ, d and
the two initial distributions δ and β. We have only detailed
protocols 1 and C (here C = 7) as we have observed that
they bound the performance of the other ones (here, the
5 other ones). The reason is that protocol1 implements the
least amount of randomization of the leave operation while
protocolC implements the largest one. This will allow us
to illustrate the fact that, counterintuitively, increasing the
amount of randomization of the operations does not make
them necessarily more resilient to strong adversaries.
Lessons Learnt from these Experiments: The first les-
son that we can draw from this figure is the impact of
the initial distribution on the behavior of the cluster. When
this distribution equals δ (i.e., the cluster is initially free
from malicious peers), the number of operations run in safe
states is much larger than the one spent in polluted ones
for both protocols. This holds even for very large values
of both µ and d. This comes from the combined effects
of both the join and leave operations. The former one
prevents new peers to directly belong to the core set, while
the latter one randomizes the core set population, demanding
accordingly a certain amount of time for the adversary to
successfully pollute a cluster. On the other hand, when
starting with α = β, both the core and the spare sets are
initially populated with malicious peers (proportionally to
µ). Hence this requires less effort for the adversary to gain
control of the cluster.
The second lesson relates to the impact of randomiza-
tion on cluster resiliency. For a given initial distribution
α, protocol1 always outperforms protocolC , that is for
both a given µ and a given d, E(T
(1)
S ) ≥ E(T
(C)
S ) and
E(T
(1)
P ) ≤ E(T
(C)
P ). This shows that increasing the amount
of randomization does not make the protocols more resilient
to targeted attacks.
The third lesson is linked to peers identifiers lifetime d.
For increasing values of d, the expected time spent in safe
clusters strictly increases, while the one spent in polluted
clusters slightly decreases, for a fixed µ. This is explained
by the fact that malicious peers can stay longer in the cluster,
increasing accordingly their proportion in the cluster up
to pollution. Once polluted, the adversary prevents split
operations from occurring. This increases accordingly the
time spent in polluted states and thus the lifetime of the
cluster. Clearly this phenomenon is more noticeable for
larger values of µ. Now for d close to 1, malicious peers are
allowed to stay almost forever in their cluster. This enables
them to quickly gain the quorum in their cluster, and thus
prevent any safe operation to be triggered even for very small
values of µ (see Table I). This clearly confirms that churn is
a fundamental ingredient to defend against targeted attacks.
Finally, it is interesting to remark that in a failure free
environment (µ = 0), we have E(T
(k)
S ) + E(T
(k)
P ) =
⌊∆2/4⌋ = 12. Actually ⌊∆2/4⌋ corresponds to the max-
imal expected number of steps before absorption in a one
dimensional random walk with borders (here,∆ is the length
between the two borders).
D. Successive Times Spent by Protocolk in Polluted and Safe
States
A deeper investigation of protocolk can be conducted by
studying the duration and frequency of successive times
spent in subsets S and P . For n ≥ 1, we denote by T
(k)
S,n
(resp. T
(k)
P,n) the distribution of the time spent by the Markov
chain X during its n-th sojourn in subset S (resp. P ). Thus
the total time spent in subset S (resp. P ) before reaching
subsets AS and AP is given by
T
(k)
S =
∞∑
n=1
T
(k)
S,n and T
(k)
P =
∞∑
n=1
T
(k)
P,n.
From [24], we have for n ≥ 1 and ℓ ≥ 0
E(T
(k)
S,n) = vG
n−1(I −MS)
−1
✶, (7)
where v is defined in Relation (5) and G = (I −
MS)
−1MSP (I −MP )
−1MPS , and
E(T
(k)
P,n) = wH
n−1(I −MP )
−1
✶, (8)
where w is defined in Relation 6 and H = (I −
MP )
−1MPS(I −MS)
−1MSP .
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Figure 3: E(T
(k)
S ) (Relation (5)) represented by hatched bars, and E(T
(k)
P ) (Relation (6)) represented by plain bars as a
function of k, µ and d. In all these experiments C = 7, ∆ = 7, and for the two figures on the left (resp. right), we have
α = δ (resp. α = β).
µ = 0% µ = 10% µ = 20% µ = 30%
d 0.95 0.99 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.999
E(T
(1)
S ) 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.09 12.08 12.08 11.88 11.84 11.83 11.54 11.48 11.47
E(T
(1)
P ) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.15 2.6 1518 1.14 699.7 511810822. 5.96 12597. 9299884149
Table I: E(T
(k)
S ) and E(T
(k)
S ) as a function of µ and d. In these experiments k = 1, C = 7, ∆ = 7, and α = δ.
µ = 0% µ = 10% µ = 20% µ = 30%
E(T
(1)
S,1) 12 12.085 11.890 11.570
E(T
(1)
S,2) 0 0.013 0.033 0.043
E(T
(1)
P,1) 0 0.099 0.558 1.611
E(T
(1)
P,2) 0 0.004 0.26 0.075
Table II: Successive sojourn times in transient states S and
P as a function of µ and d. In these experiments k = 1,
C = 7, ∆ = 7, d = 90%, and α = δ.
Table II shows the expected duration of successive sojourn
times in subsets S and P for protocolk, with k = 1. We can
see that E(T
(k)
S ) ≃ E(T
(k)
S,1 ) and E(T
(k)
P ) ≃ E(T
(k)
P,1), that
is the protocol does not alternate between safe and polluted
states. This is very noticeable for small values of µ while a
little bit less for larger ones.
E. Absorption Probabilities
Clusters eventually either split into two smaller clusters
or merge with another cluster. An important question to
be answered is whether or not split operations are more
frequent than merge ones (for safe clusters), and whether
or not polluted clusters merge more frequently than safe
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Figure 4: p(AmS ), p(A
ℓ
S) and p(A
m
P ) (cf. Relation (9)) respectively represented by red hatched, plain and blue hatched bars
as a function of µ and d. In these experiments k = 1, C = 7, and ∆ = 7. We have α = δ for the left figure and α = β for
the right one.
ones. Rewriting matrix M as
M =
(
T RmS R
ℓ
S R
m
P
0 ∗ ∗ ∗
)
with T =
(
MS MSP
MPS MP
)
with RvU =
(
MSAv
U
MPAv
U
)
with U ∈ {S, P} and v ∈ {m, ℓ},
then starting from an initial distribution α = (αT 0 0 0),
with αT = (αS αP ) then the probability p(A
ℓ
S) for Markov
chain X to be absorbed in states AℓS is
p(AℓS) = αT (I − T )
−1
R
ℓ
S✶. (9)
A similar computation gives the probabilities p(AmS ) and
p(AmP ) to be respectively absorbed in states A
m
S and A
m
P .
Figure 4 shows these different probabilities of absorption
for protocol1 with the initial distribution α = δ (on the left
graph) and α = β (on the right graph). Clearly in absence of
adversarial behavior (µ = 0), the cluster remains safe until it
splits or merge, and both operations are equiprobable.
Actually, we see that p(AmS ) = 0.57 and p(A
ℓ
S) = 0.43.
This comes from the fact that the initial size s0 of the spare
set is equal to ⌊∆/2⌋ = ⌊7/2⌋ = 3 (cf. Section VII-A),
and thus the probability to reach a merge safe state equals
1 − 3/7 ≃ 0.57, and thus a split safe state equals 0.43.
Thus after some initial period of growth, the topology of
the overlay is stable. Let us now observe the influence of
the adversary on the probabilities of absorption. For a given
µ, the probability for a safe cluster to split increases
with larger values of d. This confirms the results described
above: the population of the cluster increases as malicious
peers trigger less leave operations than join operations.
However, despite the fact that malicious peers stay longer
in the cluster, for α = δ, the probability for the cluster to
merge in a polluted state is very small (strictly less than
8%) even for very large values of both µ (e.g., µ = 30%) and
d (e.g., d = 90%). These results are of utmost importance
as they show that it is very improbable that polluted clusters
manage to contaminate the other clusters of the system. As
a consequence this fault-containment feature makes unlikely
the probability for a cluster to start in a state in which
the population of malicious peers is non negligible, that is
from the initial distribution β. This is confirmed in the next
Section.
VIII. MODELING THE ADVERSARIAL STRATEGY IN THE
OVERLAY NETWORK
We now analyze the impact of the adversary on the
whole overlay, and in particular the long run proportion of
polluted clusters. We consider an overlay populated with n
clusters D1, . . . ,Dn, and subject to join and leave events.
Each cluster Di implements the same protocol protocolk.
We assume that join and leave events are uniformly dis-
tributed throughout the overlay. Specifically, when a join
or leave event occurs in the overlay it affects cluster Di
with probability pi = 1/n. Thus we consider, for n ≥ 1, n
Markov chains X(1), . . . , X(n) identical to X , i.e. with the
same state space Ω, the same transition probability matrix
M and the same initial probability distribution α. However
these chains are not independent since, at each instant, only
one Markov chain is allowed to make a transition, this
Markov chain being chosen with probability 1/n. We denote
by N
(n)
S (m) and N
(n)
P (m) the respective number of safe and
polluted clusters just after the mth join or leave event, i.e.
the respective number of Markov chains that are in set S and
in set P at instant m. More formally, these random variables
are defined, for m ≥ 0, by
N
(n)
S (m) =
n∑
h=1
1
{X
(h)
m ∈S}
and N
(n)
P (m) =
n∑
h=1
1
{X
(h)
m ∈P}
.
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It has been proved in [25] that the transient state probabilities
of each Markov chain X(h), h = 1, . . . , n at instant m ≥ 0
is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For every h = 1, . . . , n, m ≥ 0 and j ∈ Ω,
we have
P{X(h)m = j} =
m∑
ℓ=0
(
m
ℓ
)(
1
n
)ℓ (
1−
1
n
)m−ℓ
P{Xℓ = j}
(10)
Note that this probability is independent of h since, even
though the Markov chains are dependent, they behave iden-
tically and each of them is chosen with probability 1/n.
The expectations of random variables E(N
(n)
S (m)) and
E(N
(n)
P (m)) are then obtained in the following theorem.
We denote by ✶S (resp. ✶P ) the column vector of dimension
|S ∪ P | which ith entry is equal to 1 (resp. 0) if i ∈ S and
0 (resp. 1) if i ∈ P .
Theorem 2: For every n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, we have
E(N
(n)
S (m))
n
= α
(
1
n
T +
(
1−
1
n
)
I
)m
✶S .
E(N
(n)
P (m))
n
= α
(
1
n
T +
(
1−
1
n
)
I
)m
✶P .
Proof: From the definition of N
(n)
S (m) and using
Theorem 1, we have
E(N
(n)
S (m)) =
n∑
h=1
P{X(h)m ∈ S} =
n∑
h=1
∑
j∈S
P{X(h)m = j}
= n
m∑
ℓ=0
(
m
ℓ
)(
1
n
)ℓ(
1−
1
n
)m−ℓ
P{Xℓ ∈ S}
It is well-known that the transient state probabilities of
generic Markov chain X are given by
P{Xℓ ∈ S} = αT
ℓ
✶S .
We thus get
E(N
(n)
S (m)) = n
m∑
ℓ=0
(
m
ℓ
)(
1
n
)ℓ(
1−
1
n
)m−ℓ
αT ℓ✶S
= nα
(
1
n
T +
(
1−
1
n
)
I
)m
✶S .
Expectation E(N
(n)
P (m)) is obtained using the same lines.
The states of S ∪ P being transient, matrix T is sub-
stochastic and so is matrix T/n + (1 − 1/n)I , for every
n ≥ 1. We then have, for every n ≥ 1,
lim
m−→∞
E(N
(n)
S (m))
n
= lim
m−→∞
E(N
(n)
P (m))
n
= 0.
Figure 5 depicts the expected proportion of safe (left
figure) and polluted (right figure) clusters after the mth
transition, i.e., that is the mth join or leave operation,
for realistic values of n and d. The main observation is that
the expected proportion of polluted (right figure) clusters
is very low even for large values of d (less that 2.2%).
Let us then observe that the expected proportion of safe
clusters is almost independent of d value. The same remark
holds for the expected proportion of polluted clusters (even
though because of the different y-axis scale used for this
figure the phenomenon is not visually straightforward). This
independence can be explained by the fact that the real churn
dominates the induced churn (represented by parameter d).
IX. CONCLUSION
The main lessons learnt from this study is that (i) shuffling
a single peer at a time (protocol1) performs better than
shuffling several peers (protocolk with k > 1). This is an
interesting property because when k = 1, the implemen-
tation is reduced to a single Byzantine tolerant agreement
algorithm run amongst spare members, compared to two
such runs for k > 1 (an additional one is needed in the
core set). (ii) By choosing an adequate value of L, i.e., the
length of the lifetime of peers incarnation, it is possible to
noticeably reduce the propagation of attacks in the whole
system, and remarkably decrease the overhead of the induced
churn at cluster level. This is another interesting result as
it demonstrates that there is no need to keep the system
in an hyper-activity to be resilient against targeted attacks.
Pushing peers smoothly but to unpredictable regions of the
system is sufficient.
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